ALLENTOWN CHRONICLE (PA)
27 March 1980

CIA 'best in world,' ex-director says

Former Central Intelligence Agency Director William Colby said yesterday at Muhlenberg College that he believes the CIA is "the best in the world" despite its decline in credibility and respect in the eyes of the public.

In fact, Colby said during his visit under the sponsorship of the student cultural affairs organization Free University that a weakened CIA over the past 20 years might well have resulted in the loss to communism of several Western European countries.

Further, he opined that the effectiveness of the agency probably has prevented the outbreak of World War III — a devastating nuclear tragedy.

Now a private lawyer in Washington, Colby defended the concept of an effective intelligence network in a free society. But he did confess to some abuses in the past.

The CIA director from 1973 to 1976 said the agency repeatedly tried to have Cuban Premier Fidel Castro killed, even enlisting the aid of "Mafia types" to help. "It was one of the more stupid things that we ever did," Colby told an audience of about 500 people at Memorial Hall last night.

He added that one of the directives he issued upon becoming director in 1973 was "no assassinations."

The former Foreign Service officer assigned to Stockholm, Rome and Saigon said the CIA was active in Chile prior to the overthrow of the late President Salvador Allende, but he denied the agency actually had anything to do with the coup that led to Allende's death, as has been publicised.

Colby also denied in a question-and-answer session that the agency spied on Dr. Martin Luther King. "To the best of my knowledge" this was never done, the former intelligence chief said.

Asked about America's anticipation — or lack thereof — of the embassy invasion that led to the capture of 50 American hostages in Tehran, Iran, Colby said the intelligence agency did underestimate the Shah's vulnerability among his people.

But he noted intelligence is not a crystal ball.

In Afghanistan, he observed, agents reported Soviet activities long before the invasion of that country, and he pointed out if agents hadn't been alert the U.S. would never have learned about the presence of ballistic missiles in Cuba in 1962.

"I don't think I would go back to the CIA," said the former National Labor Relations Board attorney. "I don't think it's good to go back to anything."

He would not, however, rule out accepting a political appointment.

ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE 1
LOS ANGELES TIMES
27 MARCH 1980

FBI, CIA

Intelligence Rules a Battle Over Rights

By ROBERT C. TOTH
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—If an American citizen who happens to be a close associate of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini has a meeting with the Iranian revolutionary leader, should U.S. intelligence agents be allowed to eavesdrop?

And what about the propriety of placing a Jewish American under surveillance if he lunches privately with the Israeli ambassador and later lobbies his congressman on behalf of Israel? Or should it be legal to keep tabs on an Irish American who meets with leaders of the Irish Republican Army in Dublin, then makes pro-IRA speeches in Boston?

In all three of these hypothetical cases, the American citizens are seemingly innocent of criminal wrongdoing. Legally, they could not be subjected to electronic surveillance or other intrusions on their privacy by U.S. law enforcement agencies conducting criminal investigations.

Yet where intelligence agencies are concerned, the situation may be far different. Under current rules and under a proposed new charter being considered by Congress, intelligence agents sometimes can encroach on the privacy of apparently innocent Americans in ways never permitted for law enforcements agents.

As a result, the proposed charter for intelligence agencies has become the center of a fierce controversy between those—including President Carter—who wish to give intelligence agencies greater freedom to combat threats to national security and those who fear that greater freedom for intelligence agents will mean erosion of civil liberties for Americans generally.

The nub of the controversy is whether Americans should be treated differently when it comes to gathering intelligence information than they are in the field of law enforcement. Put another way, the charter raises the question of whether the "criminal standard" that must be met to justify any breach of a citizen's privacy by police should be lowered for intelligence agents.

Lacking evidence of criminal activity, should agents be able to eavesdrop on the American who meets with Khomeini because he might have essential information about the U.S. hostages in Tehran? Should the Jewish American and the Irish American be spied on because of the chance that they might be engaged in "clandestine intelligence (or terrorist) activities" even though they might actually be doing nothing more than exercising their constitutional rights?

FBI Director William H. Webster, former CIA chief William Colby and even some liberals in Congress and the Carter Administration believe that the answer is yes, that there should be a lower threshhold for investigation in intelligence cases than in criminal cases.

"Few intelligence cases ever go to trial," Webster told the Senate Intelligence Committee recently. "Targets" are usually followed to learn their contacts and intentions, and steps are then taken to neutralize or misinform them and their employers without going to court, he explained. "This distinguished them from a

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ON PAGE A-22

NEW YORK TIMES
25 MARCH 1980

Colby Doubts Value of Any Law For Prior Notice of C.I.A. Moves

By CHARLES MOHR
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 24 — A former Director of Central Intelligence said today that it would probably make little practical difference whether a new law gave Congressional intelligence committees the legal right to have prior notification of covert intelligence operations.

William E. Colby, who was the chief of the Central Intelligence Agency from 1973 to 1976, told the Senate Select Intelligence Committee that such covert operations usually took time to be fully put into effect and that most operations in which he had been involved "could have been turned off" even if Congress learned of and objected to them only after they had been initiated.

The issue of "prior notification" has divided the Carter Administration, which opposes the requirement of giving such notification, and the authors of so-called "charter" legislation, meant to regulate the intelligence services.

Mr. Colby testified that he found prior notification to be "a rather small issue." He remarked that Congressional committees did not have veto power over covert operations or the power to approve them, but he seemed to believe that Congress would have considerable influence on any operations of which it had knowledge.

Effect of Objections

"The realities of these kinds of operations are that a Presidential decision to adopt them generally is followed by a series of activities to implement the program over a period of time," he said. "Whether the committees have 'prior notice' or not, substantial objection to an activity will certainly influence the President as to whether it should be fully carried out."

Mr. Colby endorsed the concept of comprehensive "intelligence charter" legislation, calling it a "sensible middle position" between an era when intelligence was conducted outside the "normal constitutional and legal system" and the clamor in the 70's for "total exposure" and rejection of intelligence operations.

The former director indicated that passage of such legislation, which is opposed by many in Congress, would make the intelligence community stronger in the long run than attempting to give it unfettered freedom. He asserted that the charter would avoid the danger of another emotional backlash by an aroused public in future years "because responsibility and accountability will clearly lie with our constitutional authorities."

Senator Lowell P. Weicker Jr., Republican of Connecticut, who is not a member of the intelligence committee, said in testimony that pending charter legislation had gone too far in an attempt to "accommodate" the White House and the C.I.A.

Urging the commitee to "hang tough," Senator Weicker said, "Those accommodations have led to the invention of a new, lopsided wheel which sacrifices many of the basic rights of the American people in a misguided attempt to smooth the path of the C.I.A."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A25

THE WASHINGTON POST
25 March 1980

[redacted]

STATINTL

Colby Urges Other U.S. Agencies To Provide Cover for CIA Agents

Associated Press

Former CIA director William Colby testified yesterday that the proposed new U.S. intelligence charter should require some federal agencies to give U.S. intelligence agents cover overseas.

"The present situation," Colby told the Senate Intelligence Committee, "is ridiculous and dangerous in the inclination of a number of government agencies to bar the use of their cover for intelligence operations approved by the Congress."

Colby said he believes the charter should provide some way for intelligence agents to act as employes of non-intelligence agencies abroad when necessary to cover their true intelligence activities.

Colby said the requirement should be attached to a provision already in the proposed new charter that would permit American reporters, clergy and professors to do work for U.S. intelligence agencies abroad.

Sen. Lowell Weicker (R-Conn.) sparked a flurry when he testified that some of the articles in leading American newspapers about congressional intelligence hearings in 1975 were written by reporters who "had been on the payroll of the CIA or were on the payroll of the CIA."

But later, Weicker told reporters he did not know of any reporters who were on the CIA payroll at the time that they wrote the articles about the congressional hearings.

The Senate committee and the House Intelligence Committee are conducting hearings on a proposed new charter that would spell out what U.S. intelligence agencies can and cannot do in the future.

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PM-INTELLIGENCE SKED 3-25
ADV FOR 6:30 A.M. EST
MINISTER SAYS CONGRESS SHOULD NOT BAR CLERGY, JO[redacted]
SPYING FOR CIA
BY ROBERT MACKAY

WASHINGTON (UPI) -- AN ORDAINED MINISTER TOLD THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE TODAY CONGRESS SHOULD NOT BAR THE CLERGY, JOURNALISTS OR MISSIONARIES AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE PATRIOTIC BY PROVIDING INFORMATION TO THE CIA.

"ALL AMERICAN CITIZENS SHOULD BE FREE TO COOPERATE WITH THE CIA, FBI, HEW, OR ANY OTHER U.S. AGENCY IN THE PURSUIT OF LEGITIMATE NATIONAL INTERESTS," SAID DR. ERNEST W. LEFEVER, PRESIDENT OF THE WASHINGTON-BASED ETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY CENTER.

LEFEVER, WHO HAS BEEN AN ORDAINED MINISTER FOR 40 YEARS, FIRST WITH THE CHURCH OF THE BRETHREN AND THEN WITH THE PROTESTANT CHURCH, SAID CONGRESS SHOULD NOT BAR CLERGYMEN, MISSIONARIES, NUNS OR JOURNALISTS FROM PROVIDING INFORMATION TO THE CIA OR OTHER U.S. AGENCIES ABROAD.

LEFEVER, CO-AUTHOR OF THE RECENT BOOK "THE CIA AND THE AMERICAN ETHIC," SAID IN PREPARED REMARKS THERE WAS "NO GOOD REASON WHY AN AMERICAN JOURNALIST, MISSIONARY, OR ANTHROPOLOGIST SHOULD NOT REPORT" FAMINE, GENOCIDE OR LESSER THREATS TO INTERNAL STABILITY IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES TO THE HOST GOVERNMENT AND U.S. OFFICIALS.

SUCH PERSONS NORMALLY SHOULD NOT BE PAID FOR THIS SERVICE, HE SAID, BECAUSE GIVING INFORMATION TO THE CIA IS LIKE REPORTING A FIRE TO THE FIRE DEPARTMENT OR A CRIME TO THE POLICE.

HE ALSO SAID THAT IN SOME CASES, "IT MAY BE JUSTIFIED FOR A CIA OPERATIVE TO POSE AS A JOURNALIST, GEOLOGIST, OR EVEN A MEDICAL MISSIONARY."

END ADV FOR 6:30 A.M. EST

CONGRESS IS CONSIDERING A NEW CHARTER FOR THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, AND ONE OF THE PROPOSALS IS TO BAR THE CIA FROM ACCEPTING HELP FROM THE CLERGY, MISSIONARIES OR JOURNALISTS.

ON MONDAY, FORMER CIA DIRECTOR WILLIAM COLBY ENDORSED EFFORTS TO WRITE A NEW CHARTER, SAYING THE DRAFT UNDER CONSIDERATION BY CONGRESS REPRESENTS "A SENSIBLE MIDDLE POSITION."

COLBY PROPOSED SOME CHANGES IN THE DRAFT, BUT SAID IT WOULD BE "DISAPPOINTING AND EVEN DANGEROUS" IF CONGRESS WAS UNABLE TO AGREE ON ANY CHARTER.

COLBY TOLD THE SENATE COMMITTEE THE COUNTRY HAD BEEN HARMED BY THE SWING OF OPINION OVER INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS, FROM TOTAL ACCEPTANCE TO "A [redacted]

THE BILL BEFORE THE COMMITTEE "REPRESENTS A RETURN OF THAT

5 ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE 41

THE VILLAGE VOICE
24 March 1980

Chilling Effects

The Snepp decision suggests that the government has rights, too. One is not to be constantly harassed on how and why it is saving the Republic.

By Eliot Fremont-Smith

Despite the giggles in *The Brethren*, one must assume that the Supreme Court knows, in a general sense, what it's doing. I mean, it isn't really the nine stooges up there. Thugs maybe, but not total nurds. It can tell right from wrong.

So it is incorrect, I would argue, to think that in *United States* v. *Snepp* the court majority merely sought vengeance for a scurrilous book and insurance that never again would law clerks tell tales, or that it merely wanted to contribute its patriotic bit to the never-ending struggle against worldwide Communism and help the president re-unleash the CIA. These may have been factors, of course—the court is only human—but not the whole story, not the main purpose of the decision.

No, the main purpose of the Supreme Court was to correct—or begin to correct—a major flaw in our Constitution, that part of the First Amendment that can be construed as guaranteeing "freedom of speech" to just about anybody, including "the press." While it is true that in previous decisions earlier Supreme Courts have allowed certain constraints with respect, say, to military information and the like "in time of war" or "clear and present danger" (not to mention an ongoing sensitivity to conflicts with the Sixth Amendment and the vicissitudes of obscenity), it is also true that over the years the court has tended to "tilt" toward "freedom of speech," even implying (in the Pentagon Papers case) that this extends to important government documents of past policy and public criticism thereof.

But to the present court, this habitual tilting obviously seems unfair—"strict constructionism" taken too far, if you will. The government, servant of the people though it is, should have some rights, too. And one of them is not to be constantly harassed on how and why it is saving the Republic—and certainly (or to begin with) not by former employees of the servant of the people whose perspective on what's proper to disclose in print is hopelessly warped by personal rancor and even opinion.

But I am leaping ahead. Actually, the Supreme Court hoped to deal with the First Amendment suddenly and cleanly. The date: last summer. The case: the enjoinment of *The Progressive* from publishing an article about the H-bomb. The article, apparently, was based on publicly available information, but the writer, a lay-scientist, had put two and two together and came up on his own with a synthesis of how the bomb worked that was too close for comfort to Edward Teller's description in *The Encyclopedia Americana* and could aid God knows what Asian or African country in building the bomb. The issue: Could certain ideas having to do with what America is all about be (as the lower court judge proclaimed) "classified at birth"?

Well! But fate intervened before the Supreme Court could establish the doctrine. Another scientist, reasoning on the sly, came up with the same H-bomb "secrets" in a letter to the public press, which was published before anyone in authority could do anything, so the case against *The Progressive* had to be dropped. (Important Constitutional decisions cannot be rendered effectively in circumstances the public is likely to perceive as silly.) A shame, since it was a single-surgery opportunity—"cut deeply, cut swiftly," the old poet said—and now the court would have to operate on the First Amendment in a piecemeal fashion. Yet *The Progressive* case was not a total loss: in terms of time, it set a new record for prior restraint.

Then, in December, the court let stand a lower court decision awarding a libel judgment against a work of fiction. I will return to this; suffice to note here that part of the proof of "actual malice" was how a character in the novel did *not* resemble the supposed, real-life libelee. Presumably, the court wished to concentrate on the upcoming Snepp and Kissinger cases, since these dealt with national interests and whatnot, while *Bindrim* v. *Mitchell and Doubleday* focused merely on curtailing literary-imaginative freedom. But a victory by declination, even though it sets no binding legal precedents, is still a victory. In a democracy, one must sometimes count on sheer intimidation, especially when—as the present chief justice has been wont to note—the Supreme's calendar is as crowded as it is these days. Why, there's hardly time to hear the basic arguments in a case—and, indeed, with *Snepp*, the court broke new ground in its quest for efficiency by wasting not a single minute with the defense briefs. Why bother when there are more important things to do, like establishing new law in footnotes?

The majority decision in *United States* v. *Snepp*, rendered February 19, 1980, was, in the main text, very simple. Upon his employment with the CIA, and again upon his resignation, Frank Snepp had signed a contract agreeing never to disclose classified information or publish anything to do with intelligence operations without prior clearance by the CIA. By publishing an account of America's withdrawal from South Vietnam, *Decent Interval* (Random House, 1977), without submitting the manuscript for CIA clearance, Snepp had violated this contract. No matter that the government had specifically declined to claim that Snepp had published any classified information—what was censorable was not Snepp's decision to make. Nor did the First Amendment apply. (Snepp, Random House, the Association of American Publishers, and the American Civil Liberties Union had all argued in the lower courts that the First Amendment was overriding.) No, said the high court—it was a contract case, pure and simple.

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FORTUNE
24 MARCH 1980

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The Multinationals Get Smarter About Political Risks

by LOUIS KRAAR

Over the past decade, American corporations have been discovering one supposedly rich foreign market after another—only to have their hopes dashed or diminished by unexpected political changes or upheavals. But it remained for the revolution in Iran, which exposed U.S. companies to potential losses totaling $1 billion, to drive home the lesson in global survival. Now even the most seasoned multinationals are looking for better means to assess—and manage—their political risks. As Stephen Blank, a political scientist with the Conference Board (the leading nonprofit research group for business), says: "Many chief executives got clobbered by winging into Iran without adequately understanding the country, and they've gone into China the same way. Now a lot of them want to improve their grasp of the world."

Like the U.S. government, the nation's businessmen confront greater turbulence abroad and wield less power than in the past. The once-favored stratagems to shape or even topple a foreign regime—in the brash tradition of United Fruit in Central America—are no longer acceptable corporate practices. In lands where payoffs to gain leverage or win contracts are customary, Americans are bound—or at least inhibited—by the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. As one executive remarks, "The time has passed when we could buy or rent governments."



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AMERICA
22 MARCH 1980

[redacted]

WILLIAM E. COLBY

A New Charter for the C.I.A.

In his State of the Union speech, President Carter called for "quick passage of a new charter to define clearly the legal authority and accountability of our intelligence agencies." He said it must guarantee that abuses not recur but also must remove unwarranted restrictions on intelligence and tighten controls on intelligence information. He said that "an effective intelligence capability is vital to our nation's security."

In response to the President's call, a bill has been introduced into the Senate entitled "The National Intelligence Act of 1980." This bill was not produced in the short time between the President's speech and its introduction, but rather is the result of a several-year debate and discussion over a new charter for American intelligence. This debate had been marked by a series of draft proposals and substantial criticism of them from all sides. The debate produced a stalemate between those who would "unleash" the Central Intelligence Agency and go back to the old days of intelligence, and those who would festoon it with restraints and controls, ensuring that no abuse ever recurred but also ensuring that it could not do an effective job. The President's initiative now breaks this stalemate but puts the debate into the public and Congressional arena rather than continuing it behind closed doors.

Other proposals have been made to cut through the epistemological discussion of a whole new charter to remove several specific burdens on intelligence. H.R. 5615, proposed by the entire membership of the House Committee on Intelligence, would establish criminal sanctions for the revelation of names of intelligence officers, agents and informants. S. 2216, introduced by Senator Daniel P. Moynihan (D., N.Y.), would add to the House proposal a repeal of a 1974 requirement that the C.I.A. brief eight committees of the Congress about anything it does abroad other than pure intelligence gathering. This requirement makes secrecy almost impossible in such operations. The bill would also free intelligence from the workings of the Freedom of Information Act, except with respect to individuals asking about their own records.

This sudden flurry of movement in the Congress with respect to intelligence is obviously the result of developments in Iran and Afghanistan. These events brought to the Washington level the growing sentiment in the nation that the 1975 exposures of intelligence went too far. The sensational and even hysterical manner in which those were conducted had exaggerated the actual record, had given grist to the mill of America's enemies and certainly exerted a depressing effect on the C.I.A.'s morale and ability to carry out its missions. Iran and Afghanistan dramatize the fact that the United States needs an intelligence service in the turbulent world around us.

But the fact that the pendulum swung too far in 1975 does not mean that it should swing back entirely to its original position. It is plain that the "old days" of intelligence cannot be repeated. In the United States, intelligence is no longer the traditional spy service answerable only to the monarch. It is instead a great center of information, scholarship and technology. Even more important, the 1975 explosion revealed the fundamental contradiction between such a traditional spy service and the U.S. Constitution's separation of powers. America changed the intelligence discipline fundamentally and has also ended its traditional exemption from normal constitutional practice.

The new intelligence charter will resolve the traditional contradiction. It seeks a reasonable position between the extremes of total secrecy and destructive disclosure. The wild pendulum swing must be replaced by a steady center position, providing intelligence the tools it truly needs in order to operate and the American public the assurance that it will not become a "rogue elephant." If the lack of precision in the 1947 charter reflected a national consensus at that time that intelligence should not be discussed openly, the 1980 charter will reflect a new consensus over procedures to ensure both accountability and the tools that are truly necessary to its mission. Both Presidents Ford and Carter (and the agency itself) issued regulations limiting its activities and requiring accountability, but these were executive actions alone. In congressional debate and final voting, the necessary issues could be joined, alternatives clarified and compromises made so that a final charter will reflect a new national consensus about intelligence.

The draft charter reflects many compromises between the executive branch and the Congress. The earlier versions produced by the Congress over the past several years were substantially different from this one. The present version reflects the gradual growth of understanding by the congressional sponsors of the necessity of some of its provisions, higher confidence in their own role of control and increased public concern over undue restrictions on intelligence.

But the few items of disagreement between the executive branch and the Congress will not be the dominant issues raised in the charter debate. These more basic questions will include whether constitutional rights must be absolute, or whether some carefully controlled exceptions may be essential to allow intelligence to perform its function to protect the Constitution. The charter bars the use of covert in-

CONTINUED

telligence against an American citizen outside the United States except in counterintelligence or counterterrorism cases when he is a suspect, or in "extraordinary cases" approved by the President after National Security Council review.

Another issue will be the degree to which intelligence officers should have a free hand, be subject to control and accountability for individual operational decisions or be restricted absolutely from some activities. For example, the charter flatly bars the use of American media, academic or religious cover for intelligence operations but establishes a specific system of accountabilty and approval for covert political and paramilitary operations.

A third major issue will be the degree of protection of intelligence secrets against those who would reveal them. The charter reflects a compromise that would punish anyone with official knowledge of the identities of our intelligence officers, agents and sources, who reveals them as the former agent Philip Agee did. The Moynihan and House bills would extend the punishment to anyone who reveals them with specific intent to impair or impede U.S. intelligence activities, striking at a cottage industry doing just that in Washington.

A still unresolved issue is whether the executive branch has the ultimate authority to decide what should be released to Congress. This has not yet been compromised in the charter draft. It does reduce the committees to be briefed from eight to two, but it provides that Congress has a right to all information about intelligence and can decide what should be released to the public. This provision will undoubtedly be compromised in the final text, as it was in previous Congress-executive confrontations, by a sensible provision that leaves the ultimate question specifically unanswered, but establishes procedures of consultation that make it unlikely that such a naked confrontation will occur.

The charter does permit the exemption of intelligence material from the normal workings of the Freedom of Information Act, ending the absurd situation in which our nation's intelligence services were required by law to respond to requests from Eastern Europe about their secrets. It will have to respond with respect to individual citizens asking about records with their own names upon them.

A fine point of distinction has been drawn as to whether Congress will be informed prior to certain intelligence operations or whether they will be informed in a "timely manner," immediately after the decision to initiate them. This is hardly a major issue as the practicalities are that the "timely" provision will ensure that the Congress will be aware soon enough to effect or even to reverse a decision to launch an intelligence action. The requirement of prior warning could either delay action or force consultation and generate opposition in Congress before the President has even made up his own mind whether or not to proceed.

Each of these provisions, whether compromised between the executive branch and Congress or whether still the subject of different positions, will be debated by the contrasting interest groups affected or concerned by them. This raises the danger that the public debate can become bogged down between extreme positions, as the debate between Congress and executive has been for the past several years. In this situation, the choice can become no charter and a continuation of the present unsatisfactory situation, or a quick turn to the Moynihan proposals. These are transparently necessary, however incomplete they are, but their chief drawback is that they suggest a mere return to the "old days" of intelligence operations. The opportunity to form a new national consensus can thus be lost because of the intransigence of individual interest groups. This could later produce another swing of the pendulum against intelligence, left without clear guidance and in confusion in the interim. Now is the time to make the compromises to form a new national consensus, giving the intelligence community its marching orders under our constitutional system, and let it get back to work.

«William E. Colby *was director of the Central Intelligence Agency from 1973 to 1976.*»

OFFICE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS

Date. 12 March 1980
Item No. 2
Ref. No. [redacted]

NEWS SERVICE

STATINTL

DISTRIBUTION II

STATINTL

R A CZCEEVZYV A0584
FPM-COLBY;140
FCOLBY DENIES CIA INVOLVED IN IRANIAN TORTURE
VANCOUVER; BRITISH COLUMBIA (AP) - WILLIAM COLBY SAYS THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WORKED WITH SAVAK; THE IRANIAN SECRET POLICE; IN COVERT OPERATIONS AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION; BUT DENIED THE CIA WAS INVOLVED IN TORTURE IN IRAN.

COLBY; WHO SERVED AS CIA DIRECTOR FROM 1973 TO 1976; DENIED IRANIAN ACCUSATIONS THAT THE AGENCY WAS INVOLVED WITH SAVAK IN PRACTICING TORTURE TECHNIQUES DURING THE REIGN OF DEPOSED SHAH MOHAMMAD REZA PAHLAVI.

SPEAKING TUESDAY ON A RADIO TALK SHOW; COLBY SAID THE CIA RECEIVED HELP FROM SAVAK IN MONITORING SOVIET MILITARY MOVEMENTS.

''AS FOR THE TORTURE AND THAT SORT OF THING; I'M SURE THAT THE SAVAK ORGANIZATION; IN PART; DID SOME OF THIS;'' COLBY SAID. ''I'M NOT SURE HOW MUCH; QUITE FRANKLY; AND THE ONE THING I AM ABSOLUTELY SURE OF IS THAT THE CIA HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH IT; NOTHING.

''I KNOW THAT FOR A FACT.

''SURE; WE WORKED WITH THE SAVAK IN ORDER TO HAVE ... THE LISTENING POSTS THAT GAVE US A UNIQUE COVERAGE OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS.''
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STATINTL

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ON PAGE 5

THE GEORGETOWN VOIC
(GEORGETOWN UNIVERS
11 March 1980

CIA and Georg

The Hilltop Connec

By Philipp Borinski

Georgetown University's special position within the political establishment of this country is not any hot news. Nixon kept referring to Kissinger and his political circle as the "Georgetown-Set", and in these days it has almost become a commonplace to speak of the SFS—faculty and the GU-run "Center for Strategic and International Studies" (CSIS), sprinkled as they are with former high government-officials, as a (republican)" government in exile". What strikes, however, is the "special relationship" GU seems to enjoy with a particular part of the political establishment—the CIA, or, more accurately, the "pre-Carter-CIA".

"Unholy alliance" or "Entente cordiale"? These terms appear to characterize the respective viewpoints of the two camps in which the GU-community is split over the issue and who all too often fail to discuss it seriously. This article is meant to shift the debate somewhat from emotional or self-righteous mutual accusations, based on moral and political principles; to a more objective approach toward the matter, based on the availalbe, for a *Voice*-reporter naturally limited information.

To the student-observer, the mentioned "special relationship" presents itself mainly in the form of personal bonds, on the academic level, between the CIA and CIA-related private organizations on the one side and GU on the other. Beyond that, however, these "CIA-academicians" do engage in open political activities, chiefly in the context of the current efforts to beef up a supposedly impotent CIA and of the Bush-campaign. Finally, the CIA qua CIA operated and presumably still operates on Campus—both overtly and covertly. It is those three points—academic relations, political activities and CIA-operations on Campus—that are worth illuminating in GU's "CIA-connection".

The list of former high CIA-officers no associated to GU/CSIS is indeed impre sive. It even includes two retired Directo of Central Intelligence, James Schlesinge now senior adviser and chairman of study-group with the CSIS, and Willia Colby, a "friend of the School of Forei Service". In the "Second rank" one fin names of CIA-career-officers who he crucial positions during their time of acti duty: Cord Meyer, formerly station chi in London, now senior research associa at the SFS; Jack Maury, formerly stati chief in Athens till shortly after the co of the colonels in April 1967, then leg lative counselor to the CIA, now memb of the MSFS-faculty; Ray Cline, forme deputy director for intelligence, now e cutive director of the CSIS; George Carv formerly station chief in Saigon and W Germany, now senior fellow at the CSIS. And Allan Goodman, professor of international politics at the SFS, is also an active CIA-officer, serving on Turner's presidential briefing staff.

To be sure, there remained a gray-zone between the politically oriented research-interests of retired CIA-officers and the limits GU could possibly go to in offering these individuals facilities for teaching and publishing, without compromising its reputation for academic freedom and practiced Catholic ideals. This gray-zone was filled out by the National Intelligence Study Center, founded and organized by Ray Cline, and the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, with Cline as a prominent member and Roy Godson, professor of government at GU, as chief-coordinator. Comprised of former CIA-people, other retired government-officials and scholars of some of the country's top-universities, these organizations, according to Cline, "serve the purpose of encouraging serious study and writing on the role of intelli-

Carver did not preclude the possibility that some colleagues of his "may privately engage in classified research". But who else except some "good old friends" being still on the government-payroll can turn up the necessary sources?

In the eyes of Father McSorley, well-known on Campus for his pacifist opinions, all these facts are simply a "disgrace". According to McSorley it is "harmful for GU to have persons on Campus who represent an organization guilty of severe violations of law, morality and human dignity". Only if they disassociate themselves from the values embodied by the CIA, he said, may they teach here. One may well assume that Father McSorley does not stand aloof with this view on our Campus.

In defending their presence at GU the persons in question themselves usually cite its high academic calibre and advantageous location as reasons for their decision to join it. "Most retired CIA-people want to stay in D.C., because they cannot do without their daily fix of interesting infromation and political action", Cline says. "When I started to look about for a place with the right atmosphere, administrative support and good research facilities, I discovered that Georgetown, in its kind of curriculum, faculty and students, came closer to my ideas than any other institution". In so far Cline sees "a natural affinity, especially between the SFS and the intelligence-community".